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ABSTRACT
One of the defining features of the Uniform Commercial Code Article
9 is the secured creditor’s ability to take possession of the collateral upon
the debtor’s default “without breach of peace.” This standard is meant to
protect the debtor from abusive secured creditors, the meaning of which
has been shaped by courts on a case-by-case basis.
In reforming their secured transactions laws to enhance access to
credit, continental legal systems have shown great reception to Article 9
by adopting the unitary concept and functional approach to security interests, introducing private enforcement mechanisms, including various
forms of self-help repossession. However, the “without breach of peace”
standard seems to be rejected by most national laws and international legal instruments acceded to by civil law countries, to accommodate the
supposedly alien idea of self-help repossession with civil law tradition.
Based on comparative analysis of secured transactions laws of the US,
the UK, Romania, and Hungary (representing national laws), and the
Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment
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along with the Aircraft Protocol and the Draft Common Frame of Reference (representing international legal instruments), this article demonstrates that continental European legal systems are generally apprehensive with the “without breach of peace” standard. Thus, they are reluctant
to transplant it to their legislation and try to either modify it or replace it
with different legal requirements.
This article concludes that the alternatives of the “without breach of
peace” standard prevailing in continental legal systems undermine the
privilege of the secured creditor, pose enforcement problems (such as uncertainty of creditors’ rights and possible abuses against consumer-debtors), and restrain out-of-court enforcement.
Keywords: enforcement of security right, self-help repossession, without
breach of peace, judicial repossession, UCC Article 9, Louisiana, access
to credit, secured creditor, consumer-debtor, civil law

I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed a wave of secured transactions law
reforms in many countries including Central and Eastern European
(CEE) countries such as Croatia, 1 Hungary, 2 Poland, 3 and Romania. 4 International organizations such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 5 and the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) supplied
1. See Patricia Živković, Floating Security Interest:Comparative Analysis
of US, English and Croatian Approaches, in OFFICIAL ALMANAC OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: THE MILESTONES OF LAW IN THE AREA OF
CENTRAL EUROPE 2013 1050-1058 (Comenius Univ. 2013).
2. Hungary reformed its secured transactions law in 1996 and in 2001, and
the latest comprehensive reform took place in 2013 with the enactment of the évi
V. törvény a Polgári Törvénykönyvről (Hungarian Civil Code or HUCC), available at https://perma.cc/4327-5LD4. Book Five, Part Three, Title VII, Chapter XXI
deals with secured transactions.
3. See the Polish Law on Registered Pledges and the Pledge Registry (1996),
arts. 1-14, available at https://perma.cc/P42C-27E6.
4. See Tit. VI of Law 99/1999 on Measures for Accelerating Economic Reform published in the Official Gazette no. 236/27.05.1999, repealed and replaced
by Tit. XI, C. Civ. published in the Official Gazette no. 505/15.07.2011. No English translation is available, but the Romanian text is available at https://perma.cc
/9AVS-HDFS.
5. See John L. Simpson et al., Model Law on Secured Transactions, European Bank for Reconstruction & Development (2004), https://perma.cc/JTX6UYKP.
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countries looking to reform their secured transactions laws with
model laws. 6 The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) administers international conventions and
protocols governing secured transactions.7 The conventional wisdom has been that Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter Article 9),8 originating in a common law country with advanced economic and legal systems—the U.S.—is incompatible
6. See UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions
(New York, 2010), https://perma.cc/8NGB-K73X. This document contains core
provisions that UNCITRAL believes any secured transactions should contain.
States that opt to use the document can make use of it as it is or add to the provisions of the document. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
also published a model law on secured transactions back in 1994. Since it was
first published, the model law has been widely circulated and has served as a catalyst for defining the essential requirements of a collateral law in a modern market
economy. It is not intended as detailed legislation for direct incorporation into
local legal systems, but it has been widely used by the Bank and other institutions
to support reform projects. For text, see Simpson et al., supra note 5.
7. The main UNIDROIT legal instruments governing security rights are the
Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (2001), commonly
referred to as the “Cape Town Convention,” and its three additional protocols,
i.e., the Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment
on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment (2001), the Luxembourg Protocol to
the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Railway Rolling Stock (2007), the Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Space Assets (2012),
and Protocol to the Cape Town Convention on Matters Specific to Agricultural,
Construction and Mining Equipment (work in progress). For details on these legal
documents, see UNIDROIT, https://perma.cc/BC2V-EQWY (follow “Instruments;” then follow “Security Interests”).
8. First published in 1952, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is one of
the longest and most detailed uniform acts and has been adopted by all 50 states
in the United States in the form of statutes. Prepared by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute (ALI), the UCC in the beginning represented a recommendation of the laws
that should be adopted by the states. The Permanent Editorial Board was later
established to continue adapting the UCC to future changes. Although its substantive content in all states is substantially similar, some states have made structural
modifications to conform to local practices. (In Louisiana, for example, the UCC
is referred to as a “Louisiana Civil Code.”) UCC Article 9 was significantly revised in 2001, and these substantive revisions have been adopted in every state
and govern virtually all transactions within the UCC’s scope. They have simplified the use of personal property as collateral by providing for an almost uniform
set of rules nationwide. The UCC does not, however, apply to real estate transactions. For a brief summary of UCC Article 9’s creation of a personal security
interest, see Philip L. Kunkel et al., Security Interests in Personal Property, FARM
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with civil legal tradition. Recent national secured transactions law
reforms defy this wisdom. Moreover, international legal instruments
and model laws that represent major rapprochement of civil law and
common law traditions in the field of secured transactions law have
emerged.
The purpose of this article is to explain the reception of Article
9 in different civilian legal systems and the underlying reasons for
that reception in legal instruments inheriting some aspects of Article
9. Most importantly, this article analyses the place of self-help repossession in the continental countries and the seemingly inevitable
“without breach of peace” standard, which they replace with different legal requirements. It argues that the approach taken toward selfhelp repossession in European systems does not only have the effect
of causing unpredictability in enforcement of security rights and of
discouraging private enforcement mechanisms, but may also have
adverse consequences on access to credit.
Two features make this article unique compared to any other
predecessor. First, while previous works address whether self-help
repossession is available under and/or compatible with civilian legal
systems, 9 this article contends that self-help repossession is already
a part of many civilian legal systems. Instead, it focuses on why the
“breach of peace standard,” which is an inherent part of the device
under U.S. law, tends to be disregarded by continental systems. Second, in previous works, the civilian perspective on self-help repossession was based solely on the experience of the state of Louisiana
while continental European jurisdictions have been widely ignored. 10 However, since continental European countries have now

LEGAL SERIES—UNIVIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA EXTENSION (June 2015),
https://perma.cc/M5EZ-4DXZ.
9. See, e.g., Bruce V. Schewe, Civilian Thoughts on U.C.C. Section 9-503
Self-Help Repossession: Reasoning in a Historical Vacuum, 42 LA. L. REV. 239
(1981).
10. Id.
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showed what can be considered a paradigm shift in the field of secured transactions law, by reforming their laws in line with Article
9, this article analyses the topic by emphasizing recent developments and provides a broader perspective on civil law jurisdictions,
supported by concrete evidence.
II. THE RECEPTION OF ARTICLE 9 AS MODEL LAW IN NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
Secured transactions laws across the globe can be classified into
two main categories: the unitary model and the non-unitary (fragmented model). The unitary model is represented by Article 9, the
secured transactions laws of Australia, New Zealand, common law
provinces of Canada, and the new comers Malawi, 11 Sierra Leone, 12
and Liberia. 13 These countries where “all secured transactions on
personal property and fixtures are brought under the same roof, if a
transaction ‘in substance secures payment and performance of an
obligation . . . regardless its form or who has title to the collateral,’”
are referred to as the “Unitary Systems.” 14 However, the unitary
11. Malawi enacted the Personal Property Security Interests Act of April
2013 and joined the unitary systems of the African front. The pdf version of the
Act is available at https://perma.cc/KLT8-Q5X6.
12. The Act is named the “Borrowers and Lenders Act.” For information, see
S.U. Thoronka, Parliament Ratifies Borrowers, Lenders Act, GLOBAL TIMES SIERRA LEONE, Nov. 19, 2014, https://perma.cc/NDU4-5KFW.
13. See Chapter 5 of the Liberian Commercial Code of 2010 (Secured Transactions Law), https://perma.cc/D2CR-AAUT.
14. See Tibor Tajti, Could Continental Europe Adopt A Uniform Commercial
Code Article 9-Type Secured Transactions System? The Effects of the Differing
Legal Platforms, 35 ADELAIDE L. REV. 149-50 (2014). Tajti claims that:
With the entry into force of the Australian Personal Property Securities
Act 2009 (Cth) (‘APPSA’) in 2012, the Unitary Model of secured transactions law on personal property became part of the legal system of another major economy of the world. The quintessential feature and innovation of this model is the so-called unitary concept of security interest,
bringing all secured transactions on personal property and fixtures under
the same roof if a transaction ‘in substance secures payment and performance of an obligation . . . regardless of its form or who has title to the
collateral.’ Although there are meaningful differences among the jurisdictions that have taken over this model with adaptations to local conditions and expectations, the building blocks and crucial features—in particular the unitary concept of security interests—remain the same.
Hence, it makes sense to refer to these jurisdictions as ‘Unitary Systems.’
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model and the functional approach are not only adopted by the aforementioned common law countries, but also by civil law countries
such as Hungary and Romania, or by soft laws such as the Draft
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) 15 and international legal instruments such as the Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment.
The key characteristics of the non-unitary model are the existence of numerous legal devices that in reality secure performance of
obligations, but are not considered security devices, or even if they
are considered security devices, different sets of rules apply to their
creation, public notice (if at all required), as well as to their enforcement. The implications of this model are threefold. First, there is no
single statute (or code) that provides for a comprehensive concept
The group includes, besides Australia, the United States (the birthplace
of the model), the Canadian provinces and New Zealand. One should
also add to this list Book IX of the sui generis soft law instrument named
the ‘Draft Common Frame of Reference’ (‘DCFR’) because it represents
that farthest reaching project made in the direction of the Unitary Model
in Europe.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting CRAIG WAPPETT, ESSENTIAL PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITIES IN AUSTRALIA xxvii (2012)) (citing STUDY GROUP ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE & RESEARCH GROUP ON EC PRIVATE LAW (ACQUIS GROUP),
PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW:
DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) (Outline ed., Christian von Bar
et al. eds. 2009), available at https://perma.cc/SAR4-NDKW [hereinafter STUDY
GROUP]).
15. The Draft Common Frame of Reference came out of a European-level
project aimed at finding the common core of European private law. It is a soft law
of the common principles of the laws of European countries. The outline edition
of the text of the 648-page document, entitled “Principles, Definitions and Model
Rules of European Private Law,” referred to in a shorthand manner as the Draft
Common Frame of Reference (“DCFR”). The law of security interests as enshrined in the DCFR organized security interests following the unitary system.
All modern security devices that are intended to be included are contained in one
document. Thus, Book IX, section 1:101 of the DCFR states that:
(1) This Book applies to the following rights in movable property based
upon contracts for proprietary security: (a) security rights; and (b) ownership retained under retention of ownership devices. (2) The rules of
this Book on security rights apply with appropriate adaptations to: (a)
rights under a trust for security purposes; (b) security rights in movable
assets created by unilateral juridical acts; and (c) security rights in movable assets implied by patrimonial law, if and in so far as this is compatible with the purpose of the law.
STUDY GROUP, supra note 14, at 447.
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of security interests rather security devices are scattered in various
statutes.16 Second, different statutes provide different sets of rules
for creation, filing (if at all required), and enforcement. Lastly, certain devices are not considered security devices and thus are not covered by secured transactions law. The consequence of such a fragmented approach to security interests is a lack of consistent and uniform rules of creation, registration, and enforcement of security
rights. This leads to the inefficiency of the secured transactions legal
regime.
The non-unitary model has been the dominant model in continental legal systems such as France, Italy, Germany, and others that
have not recently reformed their secured transactions law. The UK,
although being a common-law country, also falls into this category.
Nevertheless, recent reforms in Hungary and Romania led to the departure of some civilian systems from the non-unitary model, thus
breaking with their former traditions and moving toward the unitary
model.
Finally, in the unitary systems, despite slight variations, the fundamental building blocks and features remain close, if not the
same. 17 For instance, Hungarian secured transactions law, following
a functional approach brings retention of title to the realm of secured
transactions, but does not re-characterize financial leasing as secured transactions, dedicating separate provisions for the latter. 18
Similar patterns can be noticed showing variations in the degree to
which the functional approach is adopted. However, the idea that
transactions that purport to secure performance of obligations
should be brought under the realm of secured transactions law is

16. EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS 6
(Joseph J. Norton & Mads Andenas eds. 1998).
17. Tajti asserts that “[a]lthough there are meaningful differences among the
jurisdictions that have taken over this model with adaptations to local conditions
and expectations, the building blocks and crucial features—in particular the unitary concept of security interests—remain the same.” Tajti, supra note 14, at 150.
18. Polgári Törvénykönyv (Civil Code), Book VI, Chapter LIX, Sections
6:409 et seq. are dedicated to financial leasing agreements.
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echoed across the jurisdictions that can be categorized under the unitary model.
With the above background on the reception of Article 9 in other
jurisdictions, it ought to be inquired why Article 9 is being accepted
as a model for secured transactions law. The reason is simple. Article 9 creates a very simple and efficient system. Under Article 9, the
fact that the same rules of creation, perfection, and enforcement apply to all transactions purporting to secure performance of obligation comes with efficiency benefits. In other words, Article 9 is
based on the idea that the cost of transaction for creation, filing, and
enforcement of security interests must be low.
Due to the functional approach to security interests adopted by
Article 9, the formal label of the transaction becomes irrelevant and
only the economic reality behind the transaction determines whether
Article 9 applies to it. This reduces the cost of transaction that would
be incurred in attempting to define its precise nature or the cost incurred when an agreed upon transaction is ruled invalid based on
mere formality. 19 Hence, for instance, whether the transaction is labeled as “title financing” or “consignment,” the creditor is not deprived of its secured creditor status. This means that if the consignor
files the transaction under Article 9, he or she is a secured creditor
without regard to the fact that the transaction is not labeled as “se-

19. FORMS UNDER THE REVISED UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9
(2d ed., Cindy J. Chemuchin ed., ABA 2009). Chemuchin maintains that:
The form of the transaction or the label the parties put on the transaction
is irrelevant for the purpose of determining whether Article 9 applies.
Rather, the determination of whether Article 9 applies is based on the
economic reality of the transactions. For example, transactions may be
characterized as a sale or lease of goods but if in economic reality security interest is being created, Article 9 will nevertheless apply . . . it is
also not required that the parties refer in their agreement to a ‘security
interest’ being created under a ‘security agreement.’ Even if parties use
terms such as ‘assignment,’ ‘hypothecation,’ ‘conditional sales,’ ‘trust
deed,’ the like, Article 9 still applies whenever security interest in personal property is being created. Similarly, it is irrelevant for the purpose
of Article 9, whether title to the collateral is in the name of the debtor or
the secured party.
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curity agreement.” The filing requirement that is imposed universally on the great majority of transactions ensures that third parties
do not have to incur the cost of inquiring the status of the potential
debtor’s property other than checking at the filing office or searching electronically where applicable. Once the third parties discover
the existence of the security interest on the debtor’s asset from the
relevant public record, they have to inquire about the specific details
from the debtor. The secured creditor has an obligation to endorse
any information provided by the debtor to ensure that the third party
has accurate information. 20 If the debtor refuses to provide the information or the secured creditor refuses to endorse the information
provided by the debtor, it is sufficient warning for the third party of
the risk of dealing with the debtor.
Article 9’s filing system along with other methods of perfection
tackle the ostensible ownership problem where publicly known
transactions lead third parties to believe that the property is unencumbered or belongs to the debtor. Ostensible ownership is a serious
problem in Germany, for instance, regarding retention of title transactions that are not subject to registration despite the rule protecting
a good faith third party acquiring rights in the encumbered asset of
the debtor. 21 Hence, whether the property in the possession of the

20. U.C.C. Section 9-210(b) states the following:
Subject to subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f), a secured party, other than a
buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory
notes or a consignor, shall comply with a request within 14 days after
receipt: (1) in the case of a request for an accounting, by authenticating
and sending to the debtor an accounting; and (2) in the case of a request
regarding a list of collateral or a request regarding a statement of account,
by authenticating and sending to the debtor an approval or correction.
U.C.C. § 9-210(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
21. Jens Hausmann, The Value of Public-Notice Filing Under Uniform
Commercial Code Article 9: A Comparison with the German Legal System of
Securities in Personal Property, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 427, 474 (1996). In
Germany, there are limitations on the protection afforded to a good-faith third
party. These limitations are that the subsequent acquirer in good faith must have
been deceived by ostensible ownership, that the subsequent acquirer must have
secured actual possession permanently—temporary transfer of possession does
not suffice—and that the subsequent acquirer must demonstrate that his or her
lack of knowledge of an existing right is not the result of his or her negligence.
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debtor actually belongs to the debtor is a matter of guesswork. This
entails significant transaction costs, a concern to which Article 9 inspired laws respond through a comprehensive perfection method,
mainly with filing.
Lastly, the enforcement regime favors private enforcement
methods through private disposition of the collateral unlike a court
administered sale, the former being faster, cheaper, and commercially sensible. 22 Self-help repossession, which allows the creditor
to repossess the collateral without assistance of the court, subject to
the “without breach of peace standard,” plays a significant role in
making the enforcement of security rights quicker and cheaper,
therefore more efficient. 23 Hence, without further ado, on the question why developing countries belonging to the civil law system are
receptive to Article 9, one must conclude that it is because it incorporates efficiency at its heart, eases access to credit, which in its turn
fosters economic development.

These are limitations to the priority right of a good-faith third party make ostensible ownership a serious problem in Germany because the subsequent third party
can invoke his or her good faith only in such limited circumstances. See id. at 47072.
22. Laurence M. Smith explains that “[a] secured party sale under Article 9
of the U.C.C. is a means by which a secured lender can realize on the debtor’s
collateral, without the need to institute litigation or bankruptcy proceedings. It is
expeditious, cost-effective and free of the adverse publicity that frequently accompanies a bankruptcy filing.” Laurence M. Smith, Secured Party Sales Under
U.C.C. Article 9: A Commonsense Solution to Maximize a Recovery, 6 PRATT’S
J. BANKR. L. 37, 42 (2010).
23. CĂTĂLIN GABRIEL STĂNESCU, SELF-HELP, PRIVATE DEBT COLLECTION
AND THE CONCOMITANT RISKS: A COMPARATIVE LAW ANALYSIS 1 (2015):
It is then relevant to bring forth into discussion the effectiveness of the
traditional judicial methods of debt recovery as compared to alternative
means, which are arguably better, cheaper and faster when considering
the creditors’ needs, as well as the efficiency of consumer-debtor protection mechanisms in place in the chosen jurisdictions, when considering
the debtor’s needs.
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III. SELF-HELP REPOSSESSION AND THE “WITHOUT BREACH OF
PEACE” STANDARD UNDER ARTICLE 9
The secured creditor can take possession of the collateral according to UCC Section 9-609 either judicially 24 or non-judicially. 25
When the creditor pursues non-judicial self-help repossession, it is
under the duty to repossess “without breach of peace.” 26 The “without breach of peace” standard is undefined by Article 9 and is left to
ex post facto determination by the courts. 27 The “without breach of
peace” standard is intended to safeguard the debtor from abuses that
can occur during self-help repossession.
Determining the existence of a breach of peace is difficult in
most circumstances. This difficulty seems to be the underlining reason for which continental systems are reluctant to embrace it in their
secured transactions laws. Therefore, the following brief overview
of the various circumstances under which courts faced this issue
serves as a stepping-stone for the rest of this article.
There are circumstances where the determination of breach of
peace is easier and clear cut, such as in cases involving physical assault by the repossessor. The task becomes challenging in cases resulting in infliction of emotional distress on the debtor or when the
self-help repossession took place through tactics such as the help of

24. There are primarily two channels of judicial repossession. These are an
action for replevin and an action for writ of possession. Depending on the state
law in question, the secured creditor has an option to resort to one of them. In
either case, a state official, i.e., a sheriff or a Marshal executes the repossession
on behalf of the secured creditor. See WILLIAM D. WARREN & STEVEN D. WALT,
SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 277 (2007).
25. U.C.C. Section 9-609(a)-(b) states the following:
(a) After default, the secured party: (1) may take possession of the collateral; and (2) without removal, may render equipment unusable and
dispose of collateral on a debtor’s premises under Section 9-610. (b) A
secured party may proceed under subsection (a): (1) pursuant to judicial
process; or (2) without judicial process, if it proceeds without breach of
the peace.
U.C.C. § 9-609(a)-(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
26. Id.
27. Ryan McRobert, Defining “Breach of the Peace” in Self-Help
Repossessions, 87 WASH. L. REV. 569 (2012).

2017]

CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS & UCC ARTICLE 9

111

a law enforcement officer or when the repossession has emotional
impact on third parties, such as children of the debtor. 28
In the US, court decisions have been inconsistent with regard to
determining the occurrence of breach of peace across states. 29 The
typical instance where courts agree that breach of peace occurred is
the use of physical assault during the repossession. 30 Court decisions
in borderline cases such as those involving: trespass, the mere presence of a law enforcement officer, emotional harm inflicted on third
parties, and verbal objection by the debtor during the repossession
have been inconsistent. 31 The inconsistency in court decisions on
breach of peace in the US leads to unpredictability for creditors involved in interstate trade. 32 Thus, McRoberts argues that leaving Article 9’s “without breach of peace” standard undefined defeats the
very purpose of the UCC. 33
28. Id. at 570-71. McRobert asks several questions showing a number of scenarios in which the determination of breach of peace can be a daunting task:
For example, if a repossession agent asks the police to provide him with
protection as he repossesses a vehicle, is this a breach of the peace that
makes the self-help repossession unlawful? Does a breach of the peace
occur when a homeowner assaults someone trespassing on his property
in an effort to repossess lawn furniture? Imagine that the same homeowner does not notice his property being repossessed, but the creditor
has to cut a lock and bypass a gate to repossess the property. Does this
breach the peace even if there is no confrontation? What if the debtor
experiences emotional distress or something happens to a neutral third
party?
29. Id. at 578-94.
30. For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that violence is
breach of the peace. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Herring, 589 S.W.2d 584, 586
(Ark. 1979). Similarly, the Tennessee Court of Appeals has held that breach of
the peace must involve violence. See McCall v. Owens, 820 S.W.2d 748, 751
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
31. McRobert, supra note 27, at 582-91. See Chapa v. Traciers & Assocs.,
267 S.W.3d 386 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008). In this case, the repossession agent repossessed a vehicle without knowing that the debtor’s two young children were in the
back seats. The repossessor returned the children after a while. The Texas Court
of Appeals held that even though the children were diagnosed with post-traumatic
stress, the repossession was not in breach of the peace irrespective of the harm to
the third party. The Court disregarded what happened after repossession and focused on the nature of the repossession.
32. McRobert, supra note 27, at 587.
33. Id.:
The courts should have a legal framework that allows them to consistently apply the law. Debtors and creditors should be able to understand
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However, the practical problems faced in attempting to apply the
“without breach of peace” call for reform, not for abandoning the
standard altogether. In response to the inconsistency of court decisions defining the breach of peace and the ensuing unpredictability,
McRoberts recommends the amendment of Article 9 to include a
two-stage determination of the breach of peace. In his opinion, the
first stage should include a list of three per se violation factors while
the second stage contains a set of two factors to be determined on a
case by case basis, 34 although the feasibility of such a proposal is
debatable.
A last point worth mentioning is that under Article 9, violation
of the “breach of peace standard” has serious repercussions. These
are criminal liability (in cases of grave breach, such as physical assault), compensatory damages, statutory and punitive damages as
well as loss of the right to deficiency claim (payment). 35

the law surrounding breach of the peace so they are able to properly repossess property and correctly ascertain when a breach of the peace has
occurred. Moreover, companies or individuals who engage in repossessions in multiple jurisdictions should not have to perform extensive legal
research in order to understand the relevant standards governing their
right to self-help repossession. This is completely unnecessary and contrary to the purpose of the Uniform Commercial Code.” (footnote omitted) (citing Karl N. Llewellyn, Problems of Codifying Security Law, 13
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 687 (1948)).
34. Id. at 594:
The UCC’s failure to define “breach of the peace” has produced considerable uncertainty and inconsistency in the scope of lawful self-help repossession. In order to remedy this situation, the UCC should incorporate
the proposed two-part test that coherently defines “breach of the peace”
in a manner that balances the interests of the debtor, creditor, and public
at large. This two-part test first identifies three categories of conduct that
constitute a per se breach of peace. A breach of the peace necessarily
occurs if: (1) there is any use of law enforcement during the repossession; (2) there is any violence or threat of violence; or (3) there is any
unheeded verbal request to cease the repossession. If none of the per se
rules have been violated, then courts should proceed to the second part
of the test, which requires consideration of the degree of trespass involved and any impact on third parties. This test will create greater consistency and predictability for debtors and creditors, and ensure a safer
environment for the public.
We find McRobert’s entire analysis and conclusion valid.
35. See U.C.C. § 9-625 et seq. (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
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IV. TERMINOLOGICAL CAVEAT
Self-help repossession is a designation used by Article 9 and secured transactions laws influenced by it. Terminological variations
across jurisdictions are inevitable, given the fact that the legal systems that transplanted it did not retain all of its original features.
Under the Hungarian secured transactions law and the DCFR, for
instance, due to the substantial peculiarities of the private enforcement mechanism they enshrined, it is difficult to refer to “self-help
repossession.” It is rather an out-of-court (non-judicial or extra-judicial) enforcement of a security right. Hence, self-help repossession, as one form of non-judicial enforcement procedure, is used
strictly to mean the right of the secured creditor to take possession
of the collateral without the involvement of a state agent.
There are two contexts in which the terms out-of-court, extrajudicial, or non-judicial enforcement are used interchangeably. The
first is when different types of private enforcement mechanisms that
do not involve state authority are being referred to. These include
self-help repossession, strict foreclosure, and private sale of collateral. The second context is when the procedure being addressed does
not qualify as self-help repossession in the strict sense.
V. THE ABHORRENCE OF SELF-HELP REPOSSESSION IN CIVIL LAW
SYSTEMS—THE STATE OF LOUISIANA: WHERE IT ALL STARTED
The intricate relationship of civil law systems with self-help repossession begins in the U.S., in the state of Louisiana 36 where selfhelp repossession faced challenges based on two major grounds. The
first challenge came from the 14th Amendment due process clause. 37

36. For detailed insight into Louisiana’s legal tradition, see A.N.
Yiannopoulos, The Civil Codes of Lousiana, 1 CIV. L. COMMENT. 1, 1 (2008), at
https://perma.cc/2UU2-JRLA.
37. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause states: “nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law….” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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While the second one stemmed from public policy based on “Louisiana’s traditional civil law hostility to self-help” that self-help repossession is considered to violate. 38
Even before the implementation of the UCC, it was projected
that Article 9 self-help repossession might face constitutional challenges in Louisiana where self-help repossession in the creditordebtor relationship has been regarded as incompatible with the legal
system in place, on the grounds of an alleged violation of due process. 39 This challenge was ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court
of Louisiana, which held that self-help repossession was constitutional. 40 The challenge contended that the 14th Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution prohibits deprivation of property by the state without due process of law. 41 The court held that because the 14th
Amendment requires only state action to comply with due process

38. Paul Joseph Ory, Nonjudicial Disposition Under Louisiana Commercial
Law Chapter Nine, 51 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1254 (1991).
39. Schewe, supra note 9, at 267 (footnote omitted) (quoting Lee Hargrave,
The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REV.
1, 4 (1974)):
In Louisiana, the incorporation may never occur. In the short run the utility of such an enactment is dubious since it would likely prove to be the
catalyst for rounds of litigation. Assuming that the Federal Constitution
is interpreted so as to uphold 9-503 and 9-504, difficulties would remain
under article I, section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution. Unshackled by
the state action limitation and as ‘a flexible provision which gives the
courts significant leeway in developing standards of reasonableness,’ article I, section 2 may be viewed as an articulation of the civilian ideas of
protection of private property. If a Louisiana creditor, acting under the
authority of the U.C.C. in a manner historically associated with the government, engages in self-help, such conduct should be deemed to be violative of the tenets of civilian due process.
40. Price v. U-Haul Co. of Louisiana, 745 So. 2d 593 (La. 1999), available
at https://perma.cc/945S-GVY2.
41. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
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and self-help repossession was a private action, it did not violate the
due process clause. 42 The Supreme Court of Louisiana also rejected
the argument that by enacting a statute allowing the exercise of deprivation of property by private entities (which amounted to a delegation of state powers and constituted a veritable privatization of
enforcement), self-help repossession should also be subject to due
process requirements. 43
Another long-standing challenge to self-help repossession,
which defined self-help repossession as it appears today in Louisiana, emanated from the incompatibility of self-help repossession
with the Louisianan policy of keeping public peace. 44 On multiple
occasions, courts in Louisiana refused to affirm self-help repossession on the grounds that it is against public peace or order. 45
Pursuant to the above, Louisiana generally banned self-help repossession except when the debtor has abandoned the collateral, sur-

42. See Price v. U-Haul Co. of Louisiana, 745 So. 2d 593 (La. 1999). In the
Price case, it is stated by way of background discussion that:
An essential requirement in any due process challenge is that the claimant must show that some property or liberty interest has been adversely
affected by state action. Delta Bank & Trust Co. v. Lassiter, 383 So.2d
330 (La.1980); Lee Hargrave, The Louisiana State Constitution: A Reference Guide 23 (1991) (state due process guarantee protects against
governmental, as opposed to private, action). Here, it is disputed plaintiff
was deprived of rights that are protected by the due process guarantees
of the federal and state constitutions against state action. The disputed
issue, decisive of the constitutional challenge, is whether defendants’ invoking the Act's provisions to conduct a private seizure and sale of plaintiff’s property constituted state action. Defendants contend that their action involved purely private seizure and private sale of property, authorized by statute and by contract between the parties, and therefore was not
state action that would implicate constitutional due process principles.
Id. at 594 (emphasis in original).
43. Id.
44. Ory, supra note 38, at 1225.
45. In Liner v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., for instance, Justice Tate
indicated that “[t]his [possessory protection in cases of eviction by force or fraud]
is done in the interest of preservation of peace in society and as a deterrent against
self-help.” 319 So. 2d 766, 781 (La. 1975) (Tate, J., concurring in denial of rehearing). See also Guidry v. Rubin, 425 So. 2d 366, 371 (La. Ct. App. 1982) and
Grandeson v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 66 So. 2d 317 (La. 1953).
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rendered it, or has given his or her consent either before or after default. 46 Hence, in Louisiana, the general rule is that the creditor has
no right to repossess the collateral without court involvement. 47 As
an exception, in Louisiana, self-help repossession is allowed with
respect to automobiles. Under the revised Additional Defaults Remedies Act, a secured creditor can repossess a vehicle collateral (1)
by sending notice to the debtor after default, 48 (2) by clearly stating
in the notice that “Louisiana law permits repossession of motor vehicles upon default without further notice or judicial process,” and
(3) without breaching peace. 49
Besides limiting self-help repossession to vehicle collaterals,
Louisiana also took further steps. Mainly, unlike under Article 9 that
leaves the determination of breach of peace to the courts in all circumstances, the revised Additional Defaults Remedies Act illustratively lists the conditions under which breach of peace occurs. Accordingly, for instance, there is breach of peace in case of unauthorized entry into the debtor’s premise (locked or unlocked) to conduct
the repossession or where the repossession takes place despite the
debtor’s verbal objection. 50
46. Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 10, Section 9-609(a) provides that:
After default, a secured party may take possession of the collateral only:
(1) after the debtor’s abandonment, or the debtor’s surrender to the secured party, of the collateral; (2) with the debtor’s consent given after or
in contemplation of default; (3) pursuant to judicial process; or (4) in
those cases expressly provided by law other than this Chapter.
LA. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-609(a) (2001).
47. Id.
48. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 6:966 (2015). Section 6:966(A)(2) states that:
Prior to the use of the procedures set forth in this Chapter, a secured party
shall send notice to all debtors in writing at the last known address of the
debtors, of the right of the secured party to take possession of the collateral without further notice upon default as defined in R.S. 6:965(C). Such
notice shall include the debtor’s name, last known address, and description of the collateral and the following in at least twelve-point type . . . .
LA. STAT. ANN. § 6:966(A)(2) (2015).
49. LA. STAT. ANN. § 6:965 (2011), available at https://perma.cc/VU5U7AKQ.
50. LA. STAT. ANN. § 6:966(A)(2),(B) (2015). Section 6:965(C) provides as
follows:
As used in this Chapter, the following terms have the following meanings:
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It should be noted that under Article 9, court decisions on
whether a breach of peace occurred in cases of verbal objection by
the debtor during the repossession have been inconsistent. Some
courts have ruled that verbal objection does not amount to breach of
peace. 51 By listing the grounds for breach of peace, Louisiana has
attempted to either avoid or reduce the possibility of the occurrence
of breach of peace due to ambiguity of the law, in line with its high
concern for maintaining public peace. While the list may prove to
be a valuable aid to courts and a possible solution to the uncertainties
caused by differences of interpretation, serving notice prior to the
actual repossession of the collateral may undermine the very essence
of the self-help remedy. These two possibilities should be considered seriously by weighing the competing interests involved: subject
self-help repossession to less burdensome conditions or impose
stricter rules in order to protect the prevailing public policy. Louisiana has chosen the latter path. Despite this, self-help repossession
and enforcement of security rights seem to function efficiently in
Louisiana.

(1) “Breach of peace” shall include but not be limited to the following:
(a) Unauthorized entry by a repossessor into a closed dwelling, whether
locked or unlocked.
(b) Oral protest by a debtor to the repossessor against repossession prior
to the repossessor seizing control of the collateral shall constitute a
breach of the peace by the repossessor.
LA. STAT. ANN. § 6:965(C) (2011).
51. See, e.g., Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Koontz, 661 N.E.2d 1171, 1173–74
(Ill. Ct. App. 1996). In this case, the debtor protested to repossession by rushing
out of his house in his underwear and yelled “Don’t take it!” The Appellate Court
of Illinois found as follows:
We note that to rule otherwise would be to invite the ridiculous situation
whereby a debtor could avoid a deficiency judgment by merely stepping
out of his house and yelling once at a nonresponsive repossessor. Such a
narrow definition of the conduct necessary to breach the peace would,
we think, render the self-help repossession statute useless. Therefore, we
reject Koontz’s invitation to define ‘an unequivocal oral protest,’ without
more, as a breach of the peace.
See also Williams v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 674 F.2d 717, 720 (8th Cir. 1982).
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VI. EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE: EVIDENCE OF STEPS FORWARD
In civilian legal systems, outside of the US, the perception of
self-help repossession has been negative. Regarding this, Warren
and Walt wrote “the Europeans tend to see it as another example of
American Barbarism: ‘You mean that the creditor can just go out
and steal the property back?’” 52 The criminalization of self-help repossession in Germany reflects this perception, 53 and so does the
failure to regulate it in other civil law countries. One possible reason
self-help repossession has been unknown in the civilian systems is
that the efficiency of judicial enforcement or the availability of an
alternative judicial remedy, i.e., judicial repossession renders selfhelp repossession unnecessary. However, as shown later, evidence
does not support this argument. Similarly to the civil law state of
Louisiana, another reason advanced for rejecting self-help repossession is its incompatibility with due process of law and public peace
and order. Even so, the judicial confirmation of self-help repossession as well as the existence of other covert self-help remedies in
civilian law 54 refute the argument of incompatibility of self-help repossession and civilian systems. 55
A. Perception and Reality
Despite the longstanding perception that self-help repossession
is incompatible with civil law tradition, there are also counter-examples manifesting that developing civil law countries, either knowingly or unknowingly, have embodied a type of self-help reposses-

52. WARREN & WALT, supra note 24, at 269.
53. TIBOR TAJTI, SYSTEMIC AND TOPICAL MAPPING OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF
THE DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE AND ARBITRATION 134 (2013).
54. For details on covert self-help remedies still present in civil law countries,
see STĂNESCU, supra note 23, at 51-95.
55. For details on constitutional challenges to self-help repossession in Central and Eastern Europe, see Alexandra Horváthová et al., Is Self-Help
Repossession Possible in Central Europe? The Case of Hungary, Romania and
Slovakia, 4 J. EURASIAN L. 83 (2011).
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sion into their legal systems. For instance, in some civil law countries, the lessor can take possession of the leased good by giving
notice to the lessee upon the lessee’s default. No additional safeguard is in place to protect the interests of the lessee who might have
paid a significant amount of the value of the property. 56
Compared to self-help repossession under Article 9 (subject to
ex post facto judicial control), the form of self-help repossession,
hardly noticed in the civil law countries, can have far-reaching consequences on the debtor. One must then reach the conclusion that
there is a discrepancy between the perception and the reality of selfhelp repossession in civil law countries. The permissibility of selfhelp repossession in financial leasing is not paid attention to merely
due to the dogmatic thinking and approach in civil law countries that
financial leasing is not a secured transaction. 57 However, under certain conditions, financial leasing for all purposes create a security
56. For instance, Ethiopia’s (civil law country) Capital Goods Leasing Business Proclamation states the following:
1) Where the lessee defaults in the payment of the rent, or commits another fault which may breach the agreement, the lessor shall grant him a
period of 30 days for remedying the default so far as the default may be
remedied.
2) Where the lessee does not remedy the default within the period specified in sub-Article
(1) of this Article, the lessor may rescind the agreement, repossess the
leased capital goods and claim related damages.
Capital Goods Leasing Business Proclamation No. 103/1998, Part Two, Article
(6), Negarit Gazeta 710. Hence, the lessor has a statutory right to repossess the
collateral if thirty days’ notice was served upon the debtor. The possibility that
the debtor might have paid ninety percent of the value of the leased good is irrelevant. This makes the device harsh for debtors under the financial leasing law.
The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) also
administers an international financial leasing law that allows the lessor to take
possession of the collateral up on the lessee’s default. See UNIDROIT Convention
on International Financial Leasing art. 13, opened for signature May 28, 1988,
2321 U.N.T.S. 41556. This convention is effective in civil law countries such as
Hungary, Italy, and France. For the status of the convention, see Status— UNIDROIT Convention on International Financial Leasing (Ottawa, 1988),
https://perma.cc/2DK2-BZQE (last updated June 28, 2017).
57. Under the U.C.C., a leasing is a secured transaction if it meets the following noncumulative criteria:
(a) it is not subject to termination by the lessee and (b) at least one of
four listed situations is present. These are (i) that the original term of the
lease equals or exceeds the remaining economic life of the asset, (ii) that
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right in favor of the lessor on the lease, as a result of which it is recharacterized as secured transactions in countries that adopted the
functional approach to security interest. 58 Consequently, the permissibility of self-help repossession in financial leasing implies that
self-help repossession has been part of civil law tradition in a field,
which is essentially similar to secured transactions.
B. The United Kingdom: Is the “Breach of Peace Standard” Used
to Vanquish Self-Help Repossession?
The presence of the United Kingdom 59 in an analysis dedicated
to the “without breach of peace” standard in continental systems
might be surprising and somehow unfit, given the fact that all of the
countries in this analysis belong to the civil law tradition. However,
although England and Wales are obviously common-law jurisdictions, they have been in constant contact with civilian systems due
to the United Kingdom’s EU membership and adhesion to the acquis
communautaire. Since it is also the only European jurisdiction (besides Romania), where the “without breach of peace standard” is

the lessee is bound to renew for the remaining economic life or to become the owner of the asset, (iii) that the lessee may renew for the remaining economic life for no or nominal additional payment, and (iv)
that the lessee may become the owner at the end of the lease term for no
or nominal additional payment.
Herbert Kronke, Financial Leasing, and its Unification by UNIDROIT – General
Report, 16 UNIF. L. REV. 23, 29 (2011) (citing U.C.C. § 1-203(b) (AM. LAW INST.
& UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010)).
At the same time, in a recent case in Romania involving a five-year-long financial leasing contract, the court of first instance of Bucharest’s First District
held that the provisions of Law 99/1999 governing Romanian secured transactions, are inapplicable with respect to leasing. The ruling is in complete contradiction to the provisions of Article 2 of the Law, which clearly state that financial
leasing contracts concluded for a period longer than a year are governed by Law
99/1999. Moreover, despite obvious errors made by the court of first instance in
the understanding and interpretation of the law, the Bucharest Tribunal dismissed
the appeal and upheld the decision. See Decisions no. 24877/17.12.2015 and
4064/22.11.2016 rendered in case no. 66094/299/2014, unpublished, at
https://perma.cc/PQA6-GFPV and https://perma.cc/E58K-PUYW.
58. See Kronke, supra note 57, at 29.
59. Although we refer to the United Kingdom as one jurisdiction, the ensuing
analysis focuses mostly on the law of England and Wales.
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(still) upheld, the authors deemed the inclusion of English law to be
beneficial for the purposes of this article.
It must be stated at the outset that the position of British commentators, such as Roy Goode, does not differ much from that of
their U.S. peers, even though the UK does not have a secured transaction law that resembles the unitary model advocated by Article 9.
However, Goode underlines that a creditor who exercises his or her
right to repossession “must take the greatest care not to commit any
of the numerous offences that lie in store for him,” and “where the
exercise to self-help involves the use of violence against the person
or property of another, it ceases to operate.” 60
This is pretty much where the certainty regarding self-help repossession and the “without breach of peace” standard ends. Bridge
states that “the law has been somewhat equivocal about whether individuals may exercise self-help as a remedy instead of pursuing
their grievances in court,” especially with respect to personal property where “the law on self-help falls significantly short of standards
of clarity and consistency.” 61 Like all other jurisdictions, Britain
also lacks a definition of the standard, which leaves the task to the
courts that will decide on a case-by-case basis. The explanation for
this trait of common law systems might reside in their court system.
Unlike civil law courts, which are bound to interpret and apply the
existing law, common law courts are also creators of law. Thus,
common law courts enjoy more freedom and flexibility in applying
the rules on a case-by-case basis, while their civilian counterparts
require clear(er) guidelines.

60. ROY GOODE ET AL., GOODE: CONSUMER CREDIT LAW AND PRACTICE (1st
ed. 1999 & Supp. 26, 2008, Roy Goode ed.).
61. MICHAEL BRIDGE, PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW 121 (4th ed., Paul Craig
ed., Oxford U. Press 2015).

122

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 10

Self-help repossession is known in the UK under the term “recaption,” 62 a right which is “constrained by the limitation that reasonable means be employed.” 63 In Michael Bridge’s reading, these
reasonable means require the creditor to serve a notice to the wrongful possessor of the collateral of his or her intention to recover it.
Additional attention should be given to the notice requirement
in the UK, for its presence here might be surprising. In the UK, the
Consumer Credit Act (CCA) 1974 introduced a series of rules designed to protect consumers who became indebted under regulated
agreements, but since most of them proved inefficient, the CCA
2006 had to come up with extra provisions designed to make sure
that all consumers in arrears receive default notices, in order to understand their position. 64 In 2014, as the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) took over consumer credit regulation, the CCA was doubled by secondary legislation, the Consumer Credit Sourcebook
(CONC), meant to strengthen the protection of consumer debtors
from unfair debt collection practices. 65
These provisions served to delay the creditor from enforcing his
or her rights until certain formalities are complied with. 66 Creditors
must provide debtors with notices before they can terminate an
agreement, recover possession of any good, or enforce any security. 67 In those cases where there has been a breach of contract by
the debtor, under the 2006 amendments, it must be provided with 14

62. J.K. MACLEOD, CONSUMER SALES LAW 759 (2d ed., RoutledgeCavendish 2007).
63. BRIDGE, supra note 61, at 121.
64. MACLEOD, supra note 62, at 813. See also COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER
LAW 527 (Michael Furmston & Jason Chuah eds. 2010) and HUGH BEALE ET AL.,
THE LAW OF SECURITY AND TITLE-BASED FINANCING 918 (2d ed. 2012).
65. See FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, CONSUMER CREDIT SOURCEBOOK, ch. 7 (2017).
66. GEOFF HARDING, CONSUMER CREDIT AND CONSUMER HIRE LAW: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE 111 (1995). See also COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW, supra note 64, at 527.
67. HARDING, supra note 66, at 112. See also FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, supra note 65, at arts 7.17 et seq.
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days (under CCA 1974, there were only 7) to cure the breach.68
Three extra arrears notices are provided for the benefit of debtors
who have made at least two installment payments, 69 to be served at
the expense of the creditor. Default notices are not required when
the creditor is simply looking for recovery of arrears of instalments,
but only when it claims damages for breach, enforcement of the
agreement or repossession. 70 Similarly, no notice is required in the
case of non-commercial, unsecured agreements. 71
The purpose of the default notices is to assist the debtor in resolving his or her difficulties. In the case of supply of goods, a default notice also suspends the right of the creditor to immediately
take possession of the goods. 72 In other words, the possession of the
debtor over the collateral is still legitimate since the right of the creditor to repossess is on hold. Obviously, these notices established by
the CCA 2006 may have the perverse effect of prolonging non-payment, but failure to provide them in the prescribed form deprives the
creditor of his or her right to enforce and ask for interest on the
amounts due or the default sum. 73 Although the consequences seem
harsh, they are a reaction to the failure of the CCA 1974 to provide
efficient redress to aggrieved debtors for not receiving notice, thus
forcing them to seek action in common law for conversion or wrongful taking of possession. 74

68. IAIN RAMSAY, CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY: TEXT AND MATERIALS ON
REGULATING CONSUMER MARKETS 474 (3d ed., Hart Publ'g 2012). The fourteenday term is maintained by the Consumer Credit sourcebook. See FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, supra note 65, at art. 7.17.4.
69. The protection afforded to debtors who have made payments is similar in
purpose to the sixty-percent rule available under the U.C.C. Given that United
Kingdom consumers must prove payment of only two installments, however, the
protection available to them is much broader than that available to United States
consumers.
70. A.G. GUEST ET AL., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSUMER CREDIT LAW 2086 §
1 (Thomson Reuters 2009).
71. Id. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Act 1974, c. 39, §§ 86C(7), 86E(8) (UK).
72. MACLEOD, supra note 62, at 815.
73. Id. at 814. COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW, supra note 64, at 527.
74. RAMSAY, supra note 68, at 474.
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Upon receiving the notice, the debtor has two options, to either
comply or not. If he or she complies in full 75 before the established
date for that purpose, then the breach is cured and treated as if it
never occurred. In the case that the debtor does not comply within
the given term, the suspension of the creditor’s rights ends and he or
she may now resort to the termination of the agreement, repossession of the goods, and levy of a default charge. In fact, although
being a common-law jurisdiction (generally favorable to self-help
remedies), the UK has the most detailed regulation of default notices
compared to the rest of the jurisdictions analyzed. Therefore, the
CCA appears as a very paternalistic and over-protective regime for
consumer debtors in the after default and pre-repossession period.
When analyzing the requirement of prior notice, Michael Bridge
concludes that in the absence of clear statutory standards and given
the uncertainty of the repossession’s aftermath, “the continuing obscurity of the right may therefore be seen as providing evidence of
a desire not to encourage reception,” 76 while the requirement of
prior notice renders quick and effective recovery of collateral almost
impossible. Thus, the UK seems to have picked the worst of both
worlds, for it overemphasizes the importance of prior-notice, which
characterizes civilian jurisdictions, and suffers from the lack of clear
standards, giving rise to the same criticism heard in the U.S.
The UK is now part of the trend where instead of adding clarity to
the standard, to ease the use of self-help remedies, the legislators
take the view that it is easier to render it unusable.
C. Self-Help Repossession in Civilian Jurisdictions Today
Recent development in secured transactions law reform shows
further steps in civil law countries where self-help repossession
started being introduced. However, the “without breach of peace
standard,” which is the center of this article, is either removed or
75. Partial compliance is insufficient. See Price v. Romilly [1960] 1 WLR
1360 (QB) (Eng.).
76. BRIDGE, supra note 61, at 122.
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modified. The question that follows is whether the fact that self-help
repossession, as designed under Article 9, is stripped of its major
features when incorporated into a civil law system turned it into a
different legal device.
The question is worth addressing before moving into the analysis of the two selected civilian jurisdictions. Self-help repossession
as a non-judicial enforcement mechanism developed in United
States case law and was statutorily recognized under UCC Article 9.
Its essential components under Article 9 are: (a) default, (b) taking
of the property by the secured creditor without the assistance of a
state official and without notice to the debtor and (c) observance of
the “without breach of peace standard.”
The authors argue that in general, the defining element of selfhelp repossession is the absence of a state official in the enforcement
(police, bailiff of the judiciary) and the secured creditor’s right to
take possession of the collateral. 77 Therefore, the fact that in Romania, the secured creditor serves notice to the debtor before repossession as opposed to the approach in the US, does not mean that the
device is less of a self-help mechanism. Rather, the notice requirement entails a consequence on the efficiency of the device.
Hungary presents a unique experience as discussed later where not
only should the creditor provide notice, but also must request the
debtor to release possession of the collateral. The creditor must quit
the procedure if the debtor refuses to surrender the collateral voluntarily. With this background, the coming sections analyze in detail
how self-help repossession is enshrined in the laws of Hungary and
Romania.

77. See Douglas Ivor Brandon et al., Self-Help: Extrajudicial Rights,
Privileges and Remedies in Contemporary American Society, 37 VAND. L. REV.
845, 850 (1984). See also STĂNESCU, supra note 23, at 8. “Self-help is therefore
a legally recognized extrajudicial alternative to traditional judicial remedies.” (emphasis in original) Id.

126

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 10

1. Hungary: Self-Help Repossession or Merely an Out of Court
Enforcement Procedure?
The Hungarian Civil Code of 2013 (HUCC) generally bans selfhelp remedies though allowing exceptions which must be expressly
provided for by law: “Unless otherwise provided for by law, the
rights afforded in this Act may be enforced by way of judicial process.” 78 The prohibition of private justice in Hungary is affirmed by
the criminal code, which criminalizes, among others, the use of
force to enforce lawful or allegedly lawful pecuniary demands, except when the use or threat of use of force constitutes an authorized
means of enforcement of claim. 79 It is within this context that
whether self-help repossession is permitted under Hungarian law
and under what conditions should be examined.
In Hungary, self-help repossession occurred in practice sometime before the enactment of the HUCC 80 despite the absence of
regulation. 81 The HUCC, which represents a major step forward in
the evolution of the Hungarian secured transactions law, introduced
an out-of-court enforcement procedure. Whether the new out-ofcourt procedure amounts to self-help repossession and whether it is
as efficient are debatable issues.

78. See PTK., bk. I, § 1:6.
79. 2012. évi C. törvény a Büntető Törvénykönyvről (Act C of 2012 on the
Criminal Code). Section 368 of the Hungarian Criminal Code, which is captioned
“Private Justice,” provides as follows:
(1) A person who, by force or by threat of force, with the purpose of
enforcing his lawful or allegedly lawful pecuniary demand, compels another person to do, not to do, or to endure something, is guilty of a felony
punishable by imprisonment between one to five years. (2) The penalty
shall be imprisonment between two to eight years if private justice is
committed: a) by displaying a deadly weapon; b) by carrying a deadly
weapon; c) in a gang; d) against a person incapable of self-defense. (3)
Where the use of force or threat of force constitutes an authorized means
of enforcement of a claim, it shall not be construed as private justice.
BTK., ch. XXXV, § 368.
80. Horváthová et al., supra note 55, at 3.
81. Id. at 3.
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The relevant Hungarian version of out-of-court enforcement of
security right has four essential defining features. These are: (a) default of the debtor (b) the creditor’s right to request release of possession of the collateral for the purpose of disposition (c) notice (ten
days for movable collateral and twenty days for immovable collateral) and (d) the debtor’s duty to surrender the collateral and refrain
from conduct that prevents the secured creditor from selling the collateral. 82 These four essential features of the HUCC private enforcement of security interest raise several concerns regarding the possibility to conduct private enforcement successfully.
First, the procedure does not seem to be self-help repossession
at all because it does not entitle the secured creditor to take possession of the collateral. It merely entitles the secured creditor to request the release of the possession of the collateral by the debtor,
which was possible even in the absence of a specific provision to
that effect. One may wonder what happens if the debtor refuses to
comply with the request. Since Hungarian law prohibits the use of
force or the threat to use force in view of enforcement, it seems reasonable to conclude that if the debtor refuses to surrender the collateral, the creditor has no other option than judicial enforcement. This

82. PTK., bk. V, ch. XXVII, § 5:132(1)-(3):
[Right of possession of the pledged property]
(1) Following the effective date of the right to satisfaction, the lien holder
shall have the right to take possession of the pledged property for the
purpose of sale, and, to this end, to call the lienor to release the pledged
property into his possession by the time limit specified.
(2) For compliance with the request of possession a time limit justified
by the circumstances shall be given, of at least ten days in the case of
movable properties and at least twenty days for real estate properties. A
residential property shall be surrendered fully vacated within a time limit
of at least three months.
(3) Following the effective date of the right to satisfaction, upon the lien
holder’s request the lienor shall release the pledged property in his possession to the lien holder within the prescribed time limit for the purpose
of sale, to permit the lien holder to take possession of the pledged property, and shall refrain from any conduct aimed at preventing the lien
holder from carrying out the sale.
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does not fit the definition of self-help repossession where the creditor is at least allowed to take the collateral without the consent of
the debtor as long as it is done in a peaceful manner.
The second point is that the secured creditor has the right to request the release of the collateral for disposition. Considering that
the enforcement right presupposes disposition, the fact that the relevant HUCC provision explicitly refers to “disposition” as the reason for which the creditor can request the release of the collateral
implies that if the creditor is not able to dispose of the collateral
immediately, there is no right to take the possession of the collateral. 83 The problem with this approach is that it is practically infeasible to make the request for taking the possession of the collateral
conditional to the immediate sale of the collateral. The practical inconvenience of this provision stems from the fact that the market
demand for the collateral might not be readily available and the creditor may not be certain as to whether he or she can dispose of the
collateral. 84 Hence, either the creditor has to market the collateral
while it is in the debtor’s possession and request the release of possession after locating a buyer or not exercise his or her right at all.
The third and overarching point regarding the HUCC private enforcement provision is whether the provision can be used to carry
out extra-judicial enforcement and whether it is efficient. The
HUCC imposes the duty on the creditor, to serve notice to the debtor
before the repossession takes place. The notice is supposed to inform the debtor of the potential enforcement through repossession
and give the debtor the chance to rectify the default, an approach
similar to UK law. If the debtor does not rectify the default under
the HUCC, the creditor can request the surrender of possession,
which the debtor can either reject or comply with. Hence, whether
the extra-judicial repossession is possible depends on the voluntary
83. See Tibor Tajti (Thaythy), Security Rights & European Insolvency
Regulation, Report for Central and Eastern Europe: Focus on Hungary,
Lithuania and Poland 48 (2016), https://perma.cc/P2ZT-S7FH.
84. Id.
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surrender by the debtor of the collateral. Nevertheless, the assumption that a defaulting debtor would voluntarily surrender the collateral seems naïve. Even if the debtor is willing to do so, the creditor
can repossess the collateral only if he or she is in the position, thus
putting another hurdle on the possibility of repossessing the collateral.
Based on the preceding analysis it can be concluded that the
HUCC extra-judicial enforcement is not self-help repossession. It is
rather an out-of-court enforcement process that gives the creditor
and the debtor the chance to avoid court proceedings, but denies the
creditor any chance of conducting non-consensual repossession.
Therefore, the “without breach of peace standard” that is supposed
to tackle abusive practices is irrelevant to the HUCC provision governing out-of-court enforcement due to the way the procedure is defined. The authors argue that the HUCC makes self-help device impotent and compels the secured creditor to resort to judicial enforcement. Consequently, it is legitimate to conclude that the provision
governing private enforcement of security interests in Hungary does
not serve its intended purpose.
2. Romania: A Toned-Down Type of Self-Help Repossession?
When Romania decided to reform its secured transaction law in
1999, the proposed text was almost an identical translation of UCC
Article 9. 85 Upon the debtor’s default, the secured party was entitled
to “take possession of the collateral or its proceeds by peaceful
means,” with “no notice . . . to the debtor before taking possession.” 86 However, the secured creditor had an obligation “not [to]
breach the peace, use physical force or intimidation, or resort to any
85. The proposed law expressly mentioned U.C.C. section 9-503 (currently
section 9-609) as a source of inspiration for article 36. See Tit. VI, ch. 3, art. 36
of Law 99/1999 on Measures for Accelerating Economic Reform published in the
Official Gazette no. 236/27.05.1999, repealed and replaced by Tit. XI, C. Civ.
published in the Official Gazette no. 505/15.07.2011, available at https://perma
.cc/3Y9U-DN6V.
86. Id. at art. 36, para. 1.
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other method designed to coerce the debtor at the time the secured
party takes possession.” 87 Thus, one could notice several limits imposed on the creditor: a) limits related to public order, b) limits related to violence (whether physical or verbal), c) limits related to
intimidation, and d) limits related to any other means of coercion.
Together combined they represented a big difference from the
American model, where the sole limit imposed by the law is the
“without breach of peace.” It is inferred that by doing so, the Romanian legislator attempted “to classify, even if not clarify,” 88 the experience of the vast US case law, although, in the authors’ opinion,
this contention has little support.
Following the approach of Article 9, the proposed law did not
define “breach of peace,” although one may argue that the insertion
of limits, like in Louisiana, had the purpose to ease somehow the
task of practitioners. The drafters’ commentary, although emphasizing the importance of repossession in reducing time and costs of defaulted credit recovery, also left untackled the issue of “breach of
peace.” It merely mentions that the legal provisions “aim at preserving a clear distinction between the peaceful means agreed to between creditor and debtor and the use of force requiring intervention
of the state to ensure lawful application of force,” 89 an explanation
hardly sufficient to clarify the practical issues posed by the novel
remedy of self-help repossession in a civilian country. Moreover, if
in the US, the lack of definition may be substituted by the ability of
American courts to create law, whereas Romanian courts can only
interpret it. 90

87. Id. at art. 36, paras. 1-2.
88. RADU RIZOIU, GARANŢIILE REALE MOBILIARE: O ABORDARE
FUNCŢIONALĂ—ANALIZA ECONOMICĂ A DREPTULUI GARANŢIILOR REALE—
INTRODUCERE ÎN REGIMUL JURIDIC AL IPOTECILOR MOBILIARE 597 (2011).
89. For commentary on art. 36 of the proposed law, see Nuria de la Peña &
Heywood Fleisig, Romania: Draft Law on Security Interests in Personal Property
and Commentaries (Ctr. for the Economic Analysis of Law, 1999), https://perma
.cc/NH2C-NFHB.
90. STĂNESCU, supra note 23, at 114 nn. 79-80.
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Additional problems stemmed out of the translation of the proposed law. The legislators translated “breach of peace” as “tulburarea ordinii publice” which means “disturbance of public order.” 91
As the literature emphasized:
[T]he peaceful character of repossession is closely related to
non-disturbance of public order. In other words, the right of
the creditor to repossess the collateral is strongly bound by
the right of each citizen to live in a climate of social peace.
The public interest prevails over the private one, for Romanian law protects mere possession, even in the absence of a
title. Thus, the maintenance of the status quo regarding possession was more important when it came to preserving the
public order. 92
The conclusion is that in Romania, the analysis of repossession
cases was not to be regarded as “a conflict between two private interests (the creditor’s v. the debtor’s) but between a private interest
versus a public one which means that the law was not defending a
debtor’s right, but only social peace.” 93
However, leaving the concept of “breach of peace” undefined by
the legislator was not the only problem. The peculiar translation
adopted by the Romanian law also posed a great deal of practical
issues since aiding standards or directions existed not as much in its
civil law, but in its criminal law. 94 One thing is certain, due to the
translation and the division of limits adopted by Law 99/1999, when
Romanians and Americans discuss “breach of peace” they do not
mean the same thing. 95

91. For the implementation of the proposed article 36, see art. 63(2) of Law
99/1999.
92. RIZOIU, supra note 88, at 593.
93. Id.
94. “Tulburarea linistii publice apare intotdeauna atunci când sunt inculcate
norme imperative din dreptul penal sau cel contravențional.” (“Disturbance of
public order appears always when mandatory rules of criminal or misdemeanors
law are breached.”) Radu Rizoiu, Garantie reala mobiliara. Executare prin
mijloace pașnice. Intelesul noțiunii “in mod pașnic,” 2 REVISTA ROMÂNĂ DE
DREPT PRIVAT 6-8 (2008).
95. “[N]u putem sa confundam breach of peace cu încălcarea linistii
publice.” RIZOIU, supra note 88, at 597.
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Because criminal law deals with mandatory rules of behavior,
any crime or misdemeanor occurring during self-help repossession
would remove its peaceful character. In Romanian criminal law, the
“disturbance of public order” has a double meaning: either producing a public scandal, or damaging moral standards. As a rule, public
scandal means a serious breach of public peace. In the area of selfhelp repossession this would imply: a public scandal caused by the
repossession of the collateral despite protests of third parties (such
as neighbors or relatives of the debtors, or simply members of the
community), acts which could not be circumscribed to violence or
intimidation against the debtor himself, and which would never be
sanctioned under the American definition of breach of peace. However, this result will affect the peaceful character of repossession
only at the time of repossession and not afterwards. Thus, for example, in the case where the creditor peacefully repossessed a collateral
consisting of a vehicle and afterwards, while driving the vehicle,
committed a misdemeanor related to driving on public roads, the respective misdemeanor will not affect the peaceful character of the
repossession. 96
Unfortunately, not even by referring to criminal law standards
does the issue of defining “disturbance of public order” become easier. Rizoiu showed that the concept differs from one normative act
to the other 97 and generally has a very wide coverage. Thus, he attempted to adapt these concepts to the needs of secured transactions
law, by stating that “disturbance of public order” is nothing more
than an intentional tortious act and that any act that causes a disturbance of the public order must have a close tie to the collateral. 98 Either way, the tortious act must be sanctioned not only by compensating the loss of the debtor, but also by sanctioning the creditor in
order to deter similar acts from being committed in the future or by
96. Rizoiu, supra note 94, at 8.
97. For a thorough analysis of the concept throughout Romanian law, see
RIZOIU, supra note 88, at 597-601.
98. Id. at 602-04.
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other persons. This would explain the choice of the Romanian legislator to include, for the first time in history, severe civil penalties
payable to the debtor. 99
A question which could be raised is the one concerning abuse of
rights. Although the law gave the right to the secured party (and its
agents) to take possession of the collateral upon the debtor’s default,
it is obvious that the said right may not be exercised outside its
boundaries. The legal interdiction to “disturb the public order” was
to set precisely the internal boundaries for self-help repossession.
Thus, a secured creditor who resorts to self-help repossession must
take all necessary precautions to avoid the “disturbance of public
order.” 100 According to the Romanian criminal law definition, the
“disturbance of public order” is different from the “without breach
of peace standard” as defined by American courts. Therefore, the
Romanian court’s task of finding a balance between the right of the
secured creditor to take back the collateral (as fast and as cheap as
possible), the rights of the society to public order, and the rights of
non-parties to the security agreements to not be affected by any repossession attempts is seriously impaired.
By referring to “disturbance of public order” as a criminal law
concept, it appears that under Romanian law the rights of the secured
creditor stretched only until they conflicted with rights of third parties. This is a very different result than the approach of the U.S.
courts where it was held in numerous cases that only directly affecting the debtor may be considered in order to impair self-help repossession. 101 In the absence of relevant Romanian court cases, it is difficult to say whether the aforementioned theoretical conclusion is
confirmed by practice, however, such absence cannot constitute
proof to the contrary either.

99. Arts. 87-88 of Law 99/1999.
100. RIZOIU, supra note 88, at 594.
101. See STĂNESCU, supra note 23, at 122-23, especially the cases in nn. 12324.
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In 2011, Romania changed its Civil Code and, together with it,
its secured transactions law. Law 99/1999 was repealed and most of
its provisions were included in the New Civil Code (NCC). The provisions of articles 2429 to 2441 of NCC now govern self-help repossession. Concerning breach of peace, the NCC specifically mentions that the creditor is banned from disturbing public order and
peace, and from resorting to any direct or indirect means of coercion,
even if his or her acts would not qualify as criminal offenses. 102 It
was inferred that despite changes in the wording, the effects of the
new law are entirely similar to the previous one. 103
However, a major change did occur. Unlike the Law 99/1999,
the NCC imposed a requirement for the creditor to serve a prior notice, through a bailiff, of his or her intention to repossess to the
debtor. 104 Although being in trend with most of the European reformed systems 105 or the suggestions of the DCFR, 106 the notice requirement undermines one of the main advantages of self-help repossession by removing the element of surprise.
Thus, Romanian law moved away from American law, which
does not require any notice to the debtor regarding self-help repossession 107 and took a serious step back towards the over-protectionism of the debtor witnessed in the UK. According to American literature, the debtor was not to be informed of the creditor’s actions
and intentions regarding the collateral, after the debtor’s default.
The simple logic behind it was to enable the creditor to repossess
the collateral fast and with avoidance of any physical deterioration
or loss of market value. At the same time, the debtor was precluded
from hiding or displacing the collateral, once informed of the upcoming repossession.
102. Art. 2440 (2), C. Civ.
103. RIZOIU, supra note 88, at 623.
104. Art. 2440 (1), C. Civ.
105. Tibor Tajti, Post-1990 Secured Transaction Law Reforms in Central and
Eastern Europe, II SZEGEDI KÖZJEGYZŐI KÖZLÖNY 1, 8 (2013).
106. See infra section VIII. B.
107. GRANT GILMORE, 2 SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1213
(photo. reprt. 1999) (1965).
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By introducing the requirement of prior notice, the Romanian
legislator now gives the debtor the upper hand, for he or she is empowered to paralyze any repossession attempts through private
means. In other words, it appears that the Romanian legislator did
its best to limit to a maximum extent (even if not by specifically
saying so) the usage of a self-help remedy. Given the code’s silence
with respect to the nature and content of the notice, the creditor may
be able to serve it on the very same day of the repossession, 108 but
it is undeniable that a resort to self-help repossession is currently
seriously impaired in Romania. Despite this, Romania remains one
of the few civilian systems that introduced and maintained the requirement of “without breach of peace” standard in relation to selfhelp repossession.
VII. SELF-HELP REPOSSESSION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS

International legal instruments governing secured financing represent the attempt to accommodate common law and civil law traditions for the sake of promoting efficiency, predictability, and security in cross-border transactions, leading to the convergence of the
two legal traditions. The negotiation of an international legal instrument governing cross-border commerce typically leads to an acceptable compromise between both legal traditions. The Cape Town
Convention (CTC) and the Draft Common Frame of Reference
(DCFR) will be reviewed in this section. While the CTC is an international worldwide legal instrument, the DCFR is a European one,
intended to pave the way to a European Civil Code.

108. STĂNESCU, supra note 23, at 127.
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A. Replacing the “Breach of Peace Standard” by Contractual
Clause for Sui Generis Industry: The Cape Town Convention
The central objective of the CTC is to facilitate financing of high
value mobile equipment by providing the legal framework for cretion, registration, and enforcement of international interests recognized by signatory parties. 109 As of 2017, the CTC has 73 contracting parties from both civil law and common law countries. 110 In the
light of the multi-jurisdictional legal and political efforts put into
designing the convention, 111 and the diversity of the membership to
the convention, it is fair to say that it represents a major rapprochement of the civil and common law legal traditions.
The enforcement regime of the CTC is characterized by wide
room for party autonomy. 112 Unless the member state in question
has opted out, the secured creditor (chargee) can take possession of

109. See Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, opened
for signature Nov. 16, 2001, 2307 U.N.T.S. 285. The recitals state:
THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION, Aware of the need
to acquire and use mobile equipment of high value or particular economic significance and to facilitate the financing of the acquisition and
use of such equipment in an efficient manner, Recognising the advantages of asset-based financing and leasing for this purpose and desiring to facilitate these types of transaction by establishing clear rules to
govern them, Mindful of the need to ensure that interests in such equipment are recognised and protected universally, Desiring to provide broad
and mutual economic benefits for all interested parties, Believing that
such rules must reflect the principles underlying asset-based financing
and leasing and promote the autonomy of the parties necessary in these
transactions, Conscious of the need to establish a legal framework for
international interests in such equipment and for that purpose to create
an international registration system for their protection, Taking into consideration the objectives and principles enunciated in existing Conventions relating to such equipment, Have agreed upon the following provisions . . . .
110. Id., Chart of signatures, ratifications and accessions, UNIDROIT, available at https://perma.cc/DRY3-4ZT4.
111. Legal Advisory Panel to the Aviation Working Group , Self-Instructional
Materials: For Use by the Cape Town Convention Academic Project (2014),
https://perma.cc/XF4C-GMQE. In particular, see Introduction.
112. Anna Veneziano, Security Interests Burdening Transport Vehicles – The
Cape Town Convention and Its Implementation in National Law, in Italian National Reports, International Congress of Comparative Law, Vienna 7 (2014),
https://perma.cc/ES2N-MMXE.
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the collateral upon the debtor’s default. 113 The remedy for the seller
with retention of title or the lessor is slightly different unless those
are recharacterized as security interests in the relevant domestic secured transactions law. 114 As this article does not dwell upon the
analysis of the slight differences in the remedies available to the
chargee, and conditional seller (or lessor), it focuses solely on the
self-help remedy, where it is available, and the conditions under
which it is exercised.
Self-help repossession is possible under the convention and the
Aircraft Protocol subject to the consent of the debtor. 115 No specific
formality is required to secure the consent of the debtor. 116 The
debtor’s consent can be secured before or after default. 117 However,
the “without breach of peace” standard has not been imported by the
CTC regime. Neither does it subject self-help repossession to prior
notice. This is rather a unique approach to self-help repossession
compared to Article 9 or the approach prevailing in civil law countries. It is different from Article 9 due to the lack of “without breach
of peace” standard. It is different from the typical civil law approach,
for instance, Louisiana and Romania because it does not require notice to be served to the debtor. The requirement of consent of the
113. Id. at 7. Article 8(1)(a) of the Cape Town Convention states the following:
(1) In the event of default as provided in Article 11, the chargee may, to
the extent that the chargor has at any time so agreed and subject to any
declaration that may be made by a Contracting State under Article 54,
exercise any one or more of the following remedies: (a) take possession
or control of any object charged to it . . . .
Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, art. 8(1)(a), opened
for signature Nov. 16, 2001, 2307 U.N.T.S. 285.
114. Article 10 deals with remedies available to conditional sellers and lessors.
For further discussion, see ROY GOODE, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL
INTERESTS IN MOBILE EQUIPMENT AND PROTOCOL THERETO ON MATTERS
SPECIFIC TO AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT: OFFICIAL COMMENTARY 58-59 (3d ed., Int’l
Inst. for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) 2013).
115. Art. 8(1) and the Aircraft Protocol Article XI (2) Alternative A Protocol
to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment, art. XI(2), Alternative A, opened for signature Nov.
16, 2001, 2367 U.N.T.S. 517.
116. GOODE, supra note 114, at 59.
117. Id.
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debtor potentially undermines the efficiency, especially when the
consent has not been secured before default.
Given that the convention along with the protocols target an industry of professionals with comparable bargaining position (e.g.,
airlines companies), the CTC’s version of self-help repossession is
easy to apply and probably sound from a policy perspective. While
promoting its foundational policy (i.e., efficient enforcement of security rights), it also strikes the balance between the rights of the
creditor, on the one hand, and the debtor’s, on other hand, by subjecting repossession to prior consent of the debtor. The midway solution between Article 9 and the civil law approach adopted by the
CTC and its protocol appears to be reasonable in its own context. To
a large extent, this convention governs sui generis industries such as
airlines and big technology companies. In these fields, it can safely
be assumed that the parties have comparable bargaining powers and
the likelihood of imposition of a standard contract clause subjecting
one party to an abusive term is low. Hence, once the parties have
agreed to self-help repossession in the security agreement or subsequently, the convention assumes that ex post facto judicial control is
not necessary.
This solution is not fit for domestic secured transactions law because the dynamics involved are different. Domestic secured transactions law must address the risk of potential abuse on consumerdebtors. This is not to suggest that a business to business relationship
is immune from the risk of abuse, but the concern is higher in business to consumer transactions. Moreover, in the industries targeted
by the convention, for instance airlines, one can reasonably expect
the parties to deal with enforcement issues in light of protecting their
reputation. Hence, the possibility of self-help repossession to occur
in practice is likely to be low. Domestic secured transactions enforcement, comparatively speaking, presumes frequent repossession
in situations where, due to the diversity of the creditors and the debtors, an aggressive enforcement mechanism is inevitable, and the
concomitant risks are higher. But the convention is another good
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example of the reluctance in adopting the “breach of peace standard.”
The authors are aware that with the coming into force of the protocol governing security interests in high value agricultural, mining,
and construction equipment, the same policy is likely to be maintained. With respect to smallholder agricultural financing, it is possible to make the argument that the farmers deserve better protection
in cases of enforcement. Either way, the UNIDROIT self-help repossession mechanisms appear to be reasonable in its limited context.
B. The Draft Common Frame of Reference
Drafted and prepared by the elite of the European legal scholars
and professionals, the DCFR was meant to be a model for a future
European Civil Code, a project no longer on the political agenda.
However, the importance and the magnitude of this document
should not be underrated, for it provides a glimpse into the possible
future of self-help repossession in Europe. The issue of default and
enforcement of secured transactions in movable assets is addressed
in Chapter 7 of Book IX, where the drafters stated from the outset
that “in many European countries there is an increasing movement
seeking an alternative to traditional methods of enforcing security
rights because of its delays, costs and often disappointing results,” 118 a statement which remained bold and revolutionary, but
may not be supported by the legal provisions that followed. 119
The DCFR places the entire burden on the creditor, overlooking
not only his or her secured status, but also the fact that once default

118. STUDY GROUP ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE & RESEARCH GROUP ON EC
PRIVATE LAW (ACQUIS GROUP), PRINCIPLES, DEFINITION AND MODEL RULES OF
EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) 5614
(Christian von Bar & Eric Clive eds, Oxford Univ. Press 2010) [hereinafter
STUDY GROUP 2010].
119. On the failure of the DCFR to change the general European approach to
self-help remedies, see STĂNESCU, supra note 23, at 42-47.
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has occurred, he or she is also strategically the weaker party in relation to a defaulting debtor. First, the DCFR requires the creditor to
serve a minimum 10 days prior notice to consumers whenever it intends to repossess the collateral, 120 which basically strips repossession of both the element of surprise and the leverage factor, since
the debtor is granted enough time to preclude the creditor from
reaching the collateral. Interestingly, the commentary addresses the
issue of debtor’s remedies against secured creditors who fail to send
notice, but does not consider any remedy for the secured creditor
who, because of proper notice, finds him or herself in the position
of not being able to recover the collateral. The DCFR obviously fails
to provide a balance between the interest of the creditors’ expectation of fast and cheap recovery and those of the debtors’ expectation
for adequate consumer protection against abuse, a balance which
lies at the core of UCC Article 9 when it comes to self-help repossession.
In fact, the DCFR bans self-help repossession in its entirety even
though it does not state it openly. 121 This unfortunate result is indirectly achieved by the provision which requires the secured creditor
to obtain the consent of the debtor, at the time of repossession. Failure to obtain such a voluntary relinquishment of the collateral forces
the secured creditor to stop any attempts and switch to the judicial
remedies available. Thus, as if the notification requirement was not
enough, under the provisions of the DCFR, the creditor does not
benefit from the possibility given to U.S. creditors to avoid the lack
120. STUDY GROUP 2010, supra note 118, at 4701, bk. IX, ch. 7, § 1, art. IX.–
7:107 (“Enforcement notice to consumer”).
121. The commentary to article IX.–7:201 states as follows:
The dilemma for the secured creditor arises if, as happens frequently, the
security provider who is in possession of the encumbered assets and who
may need them urgently for the continuation of its production or sales or
other commercial activity, refuses or attempts to delay the transfer of
possession. This Article is designed to solve this dilemma. Without saying so expressly, self-help by the secured creditor is clearly excluded
(emphasis added).
STUDY GROUP 2010, supra note 118, at 4707, bk. IX, ch. 7, § 2, subsec. 1, art.
IX.–7:201 (“Creditor’s right to possession of corporeal asset”) cmt. C.
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of debtor’s consent by repossessing the collateral from public places
or by avoiding the debtor’s presence. In other words, if the debtor
does not expressly consent to repossession, the creditor must always
resort to judicial enforcement. This is an obvious contradiction of
the aforementioned premise according to which, the DCFR recognized the need to provide secured creditors with speedy and efficient
private enforcement alternatives.
The DCFR does not mention anywhere the requirement that the
secured creditor must act in full compliance with the “without
breaching the peace standard.” However, a comment mentions the
fact that “the rules of the Article 122 proceed on the basis that the
secured creditor may proceed against the holder of the encumbered
assets only in a peaceful way. Therefore, the latter’s present or a past
consent is necessary.” 123 The drafters understanding that repossession by peaceful means equals consent is extremely limitative, especially by comparison with the U.S. model, or even Romanian law,
whose approach to what breach of peace means is broader than the
one in the U.S. Like in the case of the UK or Hungary, the only
answer to the DCFR’s position was the desire of the drafters to limit
to the largest extent possible the usage of self-help repossession and
force the creditor to shift immediately to courts, where all enforcement procedures could be supervised by the judge.
VIII. JUDICIAL REPOSSESSION
The central idea behind addressing judicial repossession here is
to determine whether there are efficient alternatives to self-help repossession to justify its mutations in the continental systems. Therefore, the following subsections investigate whether it is possible to
judicially repossess the collateral in a swift and less costly manner
and if so, what are the implications on the way self-help repossession is regulated?
122. STUDY GROUP 2010, supra note 118, at 4706, art. IX.–7:201.
123. Id. at 5632.
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A. Judicial Repossession in the U.S. in General
In the U.S., when the secured party cannot, or does not, want to
pursue self-help repossession, as an alternative, he or she can resort
to repossession by judicial action. 124 Generally, Article 9 gives the
secured creditor the right to take possession immediately upon default. Since the law protects the secured status of the creditor, he or
she is entitled to take possession of the collateral without involvement of state or court agents, provided there is no breach of peace.
This would generally save the secured creditor time, effort, and
money. However, when the debtor resists self-help repossession or
when the creditor does not want to pursue it, 125 the latter must resort
to judicial measures and obtain a court order for the possession. The
sheriff then enforces the order. Most states authorize the sheriff to
use force to take possession, 126 a right the secured creditor making
use of his or her self-help remedy does not have. The most common
way of obtaining an order is by filing an action for replevin. 127
The mechanism might be familiar to civilian systems as well.
The secured creditor files a civil action against the debtor and, immediately upon filing, he or she then moves for an order granting
immediate temporary possession pending the outcome of the case.
Typically, this does not take more than 10 to 20 days. In some U.S.
states, the procedure is ex parte which means the debtor may not
even be informed and the case is solved in a matter of hours. 128 In
124. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, PRINCIPLES OF SECURED
TRANSACTIONS 221 (2007).
125. The creditor might be reluctant in resorting to self-help repossession and
may thereby wish to avoid the risks of being held liable for potential violations of
the “without breach of peace” standard.
126. LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A
SYSTEMS APPROACH 42 (7th ed. 2012).
127. “By far the most common users of replevin today are secured creditors
entitled to possession of collateral pursuant to UCC Section 9-609.” Id. at 41.
128. See Del’s Big Saver Foods, Inc. v. Carpenter Cook, Inc., 603 F. Supp.
1071 (W.D. Wis. 1985), in which the secured creditor successfully filed an action
for replevin without notice to the debtor and obtained a writ of replevin on the
same day. Later that day, the secured creditor presented the writ to the debtor and
demanded possession of the collateral under threat that it would return with the
sheriff for enforcement. The debtor complied and surrendered possession of the
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order to obtain the writ of replevin, all the creditor needs to establish
at the hearing is the likeliness that the action will prevail on the merits. 129 Usually, the writ is conditioned by the posting of a bond in
order to protect the debtor in case the creditor’s case will be rejected.
In theory, the debtor can regain possession of the collateral by posting a similar bond in favor of the creditor, but where the default is
due to the debtor’s inability to pay the likeliness that the debtor will
be able to post such bond is low.
The distinguishing feature of this procedure is its swiftness.
Once the writ is issued and the collateral is in the creditor’s possession, the debtor has no reason to defend the action of replevin and
judgment is entered by default. 130 As a result, a secured creditor obtains possession of collateral (provided it is a tangible good) through
judicial procedure within two or three weeks, after which the creditor can foreclose the collateral by selling it in a commercially reasonable manner as per Article 9. What follows is that over-careful
secured creditors can choose to resort directly to judicial repossession, for the procedure is not much lengthier than the self-help remedy and, provided the debtor’s default is real, it poses fewer risks. 131
It might explain, for instance, why self-help repossession maintains
a limited attraction in Louisiana (being mostly used for repossession
of vehicles): judicial repossessions are just as fast.
The main difference between judicial repossession and self-help
repossession is the involvement of the judiciary, i.e., the court and

collateral. The federal case brought by the debtor alleging violation of the constitutional right to due process was dismissed. Nevertheless, states where no notice
is required are the exception, not the rule, which means that generally the procedure will not be as fast as the one described here.
129. LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 126, at 41.
130. Id.
131. Courts generally hold that the duty to refrain from breach of the peace
during repossession is nondelegable, which means that secured creditors who resort to professional repossessors cannot escape liability in case the latter engage
in abusive practices. In other words, secured creditors cannot insulate themselves
from the consequences of unlawful repossession by simply externalizing the service to a third party. Id. at 43.
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the sheriff, which makes the procedure relatively longer and, potentially, more expensive. Judicial repossession is safer for the creditor
because he or she avoids the likelihood of being sanctioned for violating the “without breach of peace” standard. Nonetheless, compared to ordinary judicial enforcement procedure, judicial repossession is cheaper and quicker and hence more efficient. Therefore, it
is an attractive remedy for the secured creditor.
B. Judicial Repossession in Louisiana
In Louisiana, the secured creditor can judicially repossess the
collateral. In other states in the U.S., judicial repossession is exercised mostly through an action for replevin. In Louisiana, it is exercised through executory process under the Code of Civil Procedure:
“Executory process begins with the filing of a special kind of lawsuit
where there is no citation and no service of process on the debtor.”132
Similarly to replevin, after the hearing of petition for executory process, the court can order the seizure and sale by the sheriff of the
collateral. 133
Executory process is faster compared to the ordinary process because under the former, the collateral after being repossessed by the
sheriff can be sold without judicial appraisal provided that waiver of
judicial appraisal has been agreed upon in the security agreement 134
132. Michael H. Rubin & Jamie D. Seymour, Deficiency Judgements: A Louisiana Overview, 69 LA. L. REV. 783, 794 (2009). Article 2631 of the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure states that executory proceedings are “those which are
used to affect the seizure and sale of property, without previous citation and judgment, to enforce a mortgage or privilege thereon evidenced by an authentic act
importing a confession of judgment, and in other cases allowed by law.” LA. CODE
CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2631.
133. Article 2638 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides that “[i]f
the plaintiff is entitled thereto, the court shall order the issuance of a writ of seizure and sale commanding the sheriff to seize and sell the property affected by
the mortgage or privilege, as prayed for and according to law.” LA. CODE CIV.
PROC. ANN. art. 2638.
134. Article 2723 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure states that:
Prior to the sale, the property seized must be appraised in accordance
with law, unless appraisal has been waived in the act evidencing the
mortgage, the security agreement, or the document creating the privilege
and plaintiff has prayed that the property be sold without appraisal, and
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and the secured creditor loses its right to deficiency judgement. 135
In order to prove his or her right to the executory process, the creditor must submit the petition along with statutorily required documents, including, an authentic evidence of the security agreement, 136 and a judgement confession. 137 Because the virtue of executory process lies in the fact that it is fast and less expensive, the
Civil Procedure Code of Louisiana gives the debtor limited defenses, 138 giving the secured creditor the benefit of enforcing its
claim without delay, “[t]hree days, exclusive of holidays, after having served the notice of seizure, the sheriff may proceed to have the
property appraised and advertisements of the sale published.” 139
The current form of enforcement of security rights in Louisiana
is the result of deliberate and cautious process of weighing various
the order directing the issuance of the writ of seizure and sale has directed that the property be sold as prayed for. There is no requirement
that seized property subject to a security interest under Chapter 9 of the
Louisiana Commercial Laws (R.S. 10:9–101, et seq.), be appraised prior
to the judicial sale thereof.
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2723.
135. Rubin & Seymour, supra note 132, at 796-97.
136. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2635(A), which states the following:
In order for a plaintiff to prove his right to use executory process to enforce the mortgage, security agreement, or privilege, it is necessary only
for the plaintiff to submit with his petition authentic evidence of: (1) The
note, bond, or other instrument evidencing the obligation secured by the
mortgage, security agreement, or privilege. (2) The authentic act of mortgage or privilege on immovable property importing a confession of judgment. (3) The act of mortgage or privilege on movable property importing a confession of judgment whether by authentic act or by private signature duly acknowledged.
137. John Pierre & M.R. Franks, The Consequence of Default to the Debtor
Under Part 5, Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial Laws: A Primer on
Debtor’s Rights, 18 S.U. L. REV. 21 (1991). See also LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN.
art. 2632: “An act evidencing a mortgage or privilege imports a confession of
judgment when the obligor therein acknowledges the obligation secured thereby,
whether then existing or to arise thereafter, and confesses judgment thereon if the
obligation is not paid at maturity.”
138. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2642 limits the defenses available to the debtor to (1) an injunction against the seizure and sale and (2) a suspensive appeal of the order of seizure and sale. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art.
2642. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2751 further limits the grounds
for granting an injunction to claims that (1) the debt is extinguished, (2) the debt
is unenforceable, or (3) the incorrect procedure was followed. LA. CODE CIV.
PROC. ANN. art. 2751.
139. George C. Herget, Comment, Execution Sales, 21 LA. L. REV. 235 (1960).

146

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 10

interests. To ensure efficient enforcement of security rights and despite the availability of judicial repossession under the executory
process, Louisiana permitted self-help repossession while delimiting its contours substantially to accommodate it within its civil law
tradition. Furthermore, despite the narrow scope of self-help repossession, Louisiana still subjects self-help repossession to the “breach
of peace standard” partially defined by statute and subject to further
ex post facto judicial control. This shows that self-help repossession
and judicial repossession cannot replace one another, but rather
complement each other. The presence of efficient judicial repossession cannot imply that the regulation of self-help repossession
should be disregarded or that some of its essential elements should
be taken lightly.
Is this procedure utilized in continental jurisdictions? If so, does
that have an implication on the way self-help repossession is regulated? While the presence of an efficient judicial enforcement procedure, alternative to self-help repossession, can make the latter less
indispensable, it is not clear to what extent it affects the conditions
under which self-help repossession can be exercised.
C. United Kingdom: Return Orders, Transfer Orders, and Writs of
Delivery
Generally in English law, in case of default, the secured creditor
is entitled to seizure of collateral by resorting to self-help remedies
(recaption). 140 Self-help remedies are favored, where available, for
they are fast, they avoid legal costs, and can bypass procedural and
substantive law obstacles to a judicial remedy. Matters are somewhat complicated in English law due to the distinction between legal
and equitable security interests. Yet once the right to take possession
due to the debtor’s default was expressly reserved in the security

140. ROY GOODE, GOODE ON COMMERCIAL LAW 121 (5th ed., Ewan
McKendrick ed. 2016).
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instrument, it can be exercised regardless of the nature of the security interest. 141 A secured creditor can seize goods without an order
of the court, provided there is no breach of peace and there are no
statutory restrictions. 142 For instance, there can be no repossession
of a good covered by a regulated agreement within the CCA meaning, without a fourteen-day notice to the debtor, 143 and court orders
are required in case the creditor must enter the premises of a debtor
to repossess goods from the consumer-debtor. 144
Judicial repossession can occur by order of the court, either directly for possession or for the appointment of a receiver, who will
have the power to take possession. Furthermore, the CCA provides
that, in an action brought by the creditor to recover possession of
goods to which the agreement relates, the court may either make an
order (a return order) for the return to the creditor of goods to which
the agreement relates, or make an order (a transfer order) for the
transfer to the debtor of the creditor’s title to certain goods to which
the agreement relates (the transferred goods), and return to the creditor of the remained of the goods (a return order). 145
Return or transfer orders have limited power, for they do not allow recovery agents to enter the premises of the debtor to recover
possession of collateral, and do not entitle the holder to seek the assistance of police officers in the process. This is problematic because the law states that if the debtor fails to comply with the return
or transfer order, the goods to which the order relates but were not
returned, the creditor must submit another application to the court.
As a result of this subsequent judicial action, the court may revoke
the part of the order that referred to the non-returned goods and order
141. Id. at 707-08.
142. BEALE ET AL., supra note 64, at 623.
143. Consumer Credit Act 1974, c. 39, § 88 (UK), available at https://perma.cc
/4VE6-HWJ5.
144. JUDITH TILLSON, CONSUMER AND COMMERCIAL LAW 196 (2011). See
also Consumer Credit Act 1974, c. 39, §§ 90, 92 (UK), available at
https://perma.cc/UJU8-96H5 and https://perma.cc/9LX6-HT8Y, respectively.
145. Consumer Credit Act 1974, c. 39, § 133(1)(b) (UK), available at
https://perma.cc/M9TL-UPNZ.
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the debtor to pay the creditor the unpaid portion of so much of the
total price as is referable to those goods. 146
The possible effect is staggering, for the (quasi-)secured creditor
faces the risk to return to the initial situation, where the default of
the debtor deprived him of both the payments and the collateral. This
possibility undermines the very idea of secured status. Later on, the
CCA states that refusal to deliver the goods at the request of the
creditor may be deemed to be adverse to the creditor and entitles the
secured creditor to bring a claim for damages in conversion. However, this does not solve the main issue of non-payment, delays, or
even impossibility to recover the collateral, for it does not empower
the creditor or his/her agents to enter the premises of the debtor to
take possession. 147
Hence, when the goods whereabouts are known and the debtor
did not comply with the return order, the creditor is entitled to apply
for a writ of delivery. The procedure requires the creditor to pay an
additional fee, but once obtained, the writ of delivery allows the
creditor’s agent to access (on sight of goods) any lock-up, land, or
garage (provided it is not attached to a dwelling house) and may use
reasonable force in order to seize the goods. 148 At the same time, a
writ of delivery also entitles the holder to ask for the assistance of
police officers in the process. They will ensure there is no breach of
the peace whilst the goods are recovered. The writ takes about 10
days to obtain and is valid for a year after, which emphasizes the
risk that within the 10 days period the debtor can move the goods to
another location and hinder repossession efforts. 149
Unlike the U.S. where judicial repossession is almost as fast as
the self-help remedy, in the UK, judicial action poses an entire series
146. Id. at § 133(7).
147. On the issue of delays and hardships faced by creditors as well as on the
alternatives available to them, see Insights: Return of Goods Orders - Understanding Your Enforcement Options, OPTIMA LEGAL, June 2015, https://perma.cc
/VZQ8-979V (last visited June 16, 2017).
148. Id.
149. Id.
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of risks to the secured creditor, requires significant amount of time,
additional costs and does not appear to be a viable alternative to selfhelp remedies (where they exist).
D. Hungary: Judicial Enforcement Only
In Hungary, the secured creditor has the option to enforce its
security right through judicial or non-judicial means. 150 However,
the HUCC does not contain any special rules regarding judicial repossession. Judicial enforcement in general is governed by various
statutes the most important ones being the Civil Procedure Code151
and the Act LIII 1994 (Judicial Enforcement Act). 152 The closer examination of the application of judicial enforcement rules in Hungary does not suggest that secured creditors have efficient enforcement mechanism alternatives to self-help repossession that can render the latter inessential. When non-judicial enforcement under the
HUCC fails, the secured creditor switches to ordinary judicial enforcement process, which is lengthy and costly. 153
According to a report prepared by a practitioner in the year 2017,
judicial enforcement of a security right takes between several
months to a year from petitioning for trial to final distribution of
proceeds of sale depending on the complexity of the case and various defenses pleaded by the debtor. 154 In a nutshell, in Hungary,
150. Section 5:126(3) of the Hungarian Civil Code of 2013 states that “The
lien holder shall have the option to exercise his right to satisfaction either by way
of judicial enforcement or by means other than by judicial enforcement.” PTK.,
bk. V, tit. VII, ch. XXVII, § 5:126(3).
151. 1952. évi III. törvény a Polgári perrendtarásról (Act III of 1952 on the
Code of Civil Procedure).
152. 1994. évi LIII. törvény a bírósági végrehajtásról (Act LIII of 1994 on Judicial Enforcement).
153. See EULER HERMES, Collection Profile: Hungary 5 (2016), available at
https://perma.cc/Z53N-RP6T. This report states:
Commencing ordinary legal action in Hungary is not advisable and amicable settlement opportunities should always be considered as a major
alternative to court proceedings. Indeed, the Hungarian judiciary system
is overall excessively formal and costly, whilst the courts have difficulties coping with the caseload because they are often ill-equipped and
there is a lack of trained staff.
154. Id.
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there is no judicial repossession procedure comparable to replevin
or executory process. Consequently, secured creditors in Hungary
do not reap the privilege offered by security interest, i.e., cheaper
and speedier enforcement of their claim against the collateral. Due
to the vigorous conditions under which private enforcement must be
exercised that effectively forces the secured creditor to resort to ordinary judicial process, the advantageous position of the secured
creditor is undermined by the system, which potentially leads to an
increase in the cost of credit.
E. Judicial Repossession in Romania
The Romanian secured transactions law also establishes the right
of the creditor to take possession of collateral by private means or
with the aid of a bailiff. 155 Like the U.S. creditor, the Romanian one
enjoys the right to choose any of the options and he or she is not
obliged to resort to self-help before employing judicial repossession. 156 The judicial repossession is simple, for there is no court involvement. In fact, the secured creditor can address the bailiff directly. The only requirement is to attach to the enforcement request
a copy of the security agreement, a description of the collateral, and
where the case may be, a certified copy of the filing with the electronic archive. At the request of the bailiff, 157 police officers must
provide assistance in recovery of the collateral. 158 Within 48 hours
of the creditor’s request, the bailiff must go to the location of the
collateral, 159 take possession, and hand it over immediately to the
155. Art. 2439, C. Civ.
156. Art. 181 of Law 71/2011 for the Implementation of Law 287/2009 regarding the Civil Code.
157. Article 649 of the New Code for Civil Procedure (“NCCP”) details the
concrete ways in which agents of public force assist in prompt and effective enforcement.
158. Art. 2442(2)-(3), C. Civ.
159. This article presumes that the location of the collateral is known to the
enforcement officer, for the obligation to identify it is his or hers and not the creditor’s. In cases where the location is not yet known, the 48-hour term is calculated
from the moment when the enforcement officer has knowledge of the collateral’s
location.

2017]

CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS & UCC ARTICLE 9

151

creditor. An enforcement minute must be drawn up immediately in
two original copies, one for the bailiff’s file and one to be communicated to the debtor. 160 All expenses generated by the repossession
effort, as well as transportation, deposit risks, and costs are advanced by the creditor. 161 In cases where the use of force is required
for taking possession of the collateral, the bailiff is obliged to return
on the same day with police officers in order to perform the repossession. 162 No court order or any other administrative act is required
thereof. 163 However, like self-help repossession, judicial repossession may trigger the liability of the secured creditor in case of a
breach of provisions concerning repossession. 164
The aforementioned provisions seem to indicate that the bailiff
is not entitled to resort to the use of public force immediately, but
must try first to obtain possession peacefully and without police assistance. Only where the use of force is necessary, he or she is required to return during the same day with police officers to take possession of collateral. Based on the above, it is safe to conclude that
like in the U.S., judicial repossession constitutes a viable alternative
to self-help repossession, although we lack hard evidence to substantiate this theoretical assessment. On paper, it is a fast, ex parte
procedure, which does not require any court involvement. The only
potential issues are the expenses which must be advanced by the
creditor and the lack of knowledge concerning the collateral’s location, which may result in prolongation of the procedure. Finally,
whereas U.S. creditors who wish to avoid any potential liability arising from the repossession choose judicial repossession, in Romania,

160. Communication is done in accordance to the provisions of the NCCP. See
COLECTIV, NOUL COD CIVIL. COMENTARII, DOCTRINĂ ŞI JURISPRUDENŢĂ § 3, 855
(2012).
161. The creditor will recover the expenses generated by judicial repossession
from the debtor by using the general provisions of the NCCP.
162. According to article 2474 of the NCC, failure to return on the same day
may result in liability for the secured creditor for any damages caused. See
COLECTIV, supra note 160, at 856.
163. Art. 2443, C. Civ.
164. Arts. 2474, C. Civ. et seq.
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creditors who resort to judicial repossession do not insulate the secured creditor from the dire consequences of wrongful repossession.
IX. CONCLUSION
This article shows that self-help repossession in civilian systems
is tainted by internal self-contradictions, with serious implications
on the success of out-of-court enforcement of security rights. This
has negative consequences on the possibility of an aggrieved secured creditor to benefit from a swift and least costly recovery of his
or her claim, thus affecting the very rationale behind security interests and secured transactions law reform.
One of the essential elements of self-help repossession under Article 9 is the “breach of peace standard,” which is intended to protect
debtors from abuses that can occur during self-help repossession.
Despite its utility, the standard is difficult to determine in many circumstances, which appears to be the reason continental countries are
reluctant to embrace it in their secured transactions laws. Instead of
improving the standard, national laws, including in the UK, and international instruments are prone to amend the self-help remedy, by
creating their own “mutated” forms, or remove it altogether.
This article argues that serving prior notice contradicts the very
essence of self-help repossession, thus putting the entire out-ofcourt enforcement system under a question mark. Removing or impeding out-of-court enforcement by curtailing its features that are
distinctively necessary for efficient and speedy recovery of the secured creditor’s claims increases the cost of enforcement, which ultimately increases the cost of credit and undermines the underlying
reasons of secured transactions law reforms.
Implementing self-help repossession requires weighing various
competing interests. The guiding principles in this regard should be
striking the balance between efficient enforcement of security rights
and protecting vulnerable debtors from concomitant risks. Article 9
offers efficient enforcement of security rights both through its self-
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help repossession provision and judicial repossession that is exercised under common law. Louisiana accepted Article 9 with substantial modifications because it had a swift and efficient judicial
repossession in place. Romania carved self-help repossession probably because it implemented an effective judicial repossession as
well, while the UK and Hungary desperately need a self-help device
because their judicial enforcement procedures are long, complex,
and costly.
The authors contend that those legal systems that took the initiative to implement a secured transactions regime based on Article 9
should maintain out-of-court enforcement, in general, and self-help
repossession, in particular, but also parallel them with tailor-made
protective measures for debtors against any sort of abuse that may
be inflicted upon consumer-debtors. Thus, instead of fearing the unknown—the “without breach of peace” standard—these states
should learn from the experience of the U.S. and reform the standard
to increase its practicability and predictability as well as provide the
courts with clear standards of assessment.
While the anxiety in bringing the relatively new concept of selfhelp repossession is understandable, it is not reasonable to implement a legal institution that wishes to introduce the benefits of an
efficient enforcement system, which at the same time negates its
purpose by placing unnecessary conditions on its practical implementation. We argue that the Hungarian secured transactions law
represents a good example of a legal regime that fails to address the
dilemma, while the experience of Romania shows a cautious approach to balancing various interests.

